NOTES ON GERMAN MAN@UvRES, 1894. 451 
extending. The reinforced firing line then moves rapidly forward in 
one general line, without any rushes, and halts at about 500 yards of 
the enemy ; here the reserves close up, and the now dense line for a few 
minutes form in a heavy and sustained independent fire. This line 
appeared to be very dense indeed, but in peace manceuvres it must be 
borne in mind that there are no casualties to cause the gaps in the 
ranks, which would be the case in war. Inthe meantime the rest of 
the division, with the exception of a small reserve which the commander 
holds in hand, is split up into companies and gradually advance in 
single rank with drums beating and fifes playing. They move quite 
independently and the whole country seemed covered with them, but 
they all slowly but surely converge in the direction of the point o 
attack till they are arranged in a sort of formation in many lines 
opposite the objective or object of attack. 
The firmg line followed by the rest then moved rapidly forward to 
300 yards of the enemy and here a tremendous fire was poured in. 
The mass in rear then closed on the firing line; suddenly one of its 
companies followed by the rest, rushed forward and in a minute a huge 
swarm without apparently any formation rushed upon the enemy, the 
firing line supporting the assault with a rapid and ceaseless fire; the 
swarm was at least 30 deep. ‘The guns had in the meantime advanced 
to about 1100 yards. It is held that when the infantry approach the 
enemy, artillery from a longer range than this cannot distinguish 
between friend and foe. It may be said that it is highly dangerous for 
artillery to approach within such a distance of infantry armed with the 
present rifles. This would no doubt be the case when the enemy’s 
infantry is unshaken and can devote its attention to the guns. But 
all its time will be taken up with the infantry of the attack, and under 
such circumstances, the guns can approach -to the nearest ranges. 
Besides, the artillery is bound to take the same risks as the other 
troops, and its propinquity gives an enormous amount of confidence to 
them. Ifat such a time the guns remain at such a distance that it 
becomes useless, it does not give the amount of support to its infantry, 
as the latter has every reason and right to expect from it. 
To return to the infantry. The position is captured, and it must be 
evident that after such an attack all cohesion will be lost, and the 
units must be all mixed up. This condition of things is constantly 
practised, and the men fall in under the nearest officers without any 
regard to their own companies, battalions, or even brigades and 
divisions. 
This was remarkably the case in the attack on the Niederwald which 
I have described, where various units of the XI. corps were mixed up in 
an indescribable manner. They were soon formed into cohesive bodies 
and resumed the forward movement. But while this is going on 
there is considerable danger of a counter-attack by the infantry: it is 
the duty of the artillery to guard against this. From its position in 
rear it is ready to cover a retirement if the assault fails; and on the 
other hand if it succeeds and the position is captured the guns must be 
hurried up to crown the position whence it must pour its fire on the 
beaten enemy, it must prevent his reforming and, if necessary, pursue 
