Ist April. 
2nd April. 
8rd April. 
502 THE ARTILLERY IN CHITRAL. 
Hoti Mardan on Ist April and reached Murree on 14th June, during 
which time we marched about 800 miles. 
At the time mobilization was ordered the three mountain batteries 
were stationed ;:— 
No. 3 and 8 at Rawal Pindi. 
No. 2 (Derajat) at Kohat. 
Their respective strengths were :— 
Officers. N.C.Q.’s and men. 
INOSS* ite, ee ene ee eee eC) 
Fy en see age 2 ange HOP gay oe ue ene ETE 
British Native Fighting : 
; ‘ ; Officers. Officers. men. Followers. 
IN@s AGW EN) oho BE nc Gan. 000. son Jb ban 0g BB 
[A section of this battery was on command in the Kurram Valley and 
did not take part in the Chitral Expedition]. 
These three batteries were under command of Lieut.-Col. W. Aitken 
with Captain G. C. Dowell as adjutant. 
The Colonel on the Staff, R.A., was Colonel W. W. Murdoch, Staff- 
Captain, Captain M. F. Fegen. . 
The batteries proceeded to Hoti Mardan by march route, seven 
marches from Rawal Pindi, ten from Kohat. 
At Hoti Mardan they joined the brigades to which they were origi- 
nally attached, viz. :— 
No. 3 to lst Brigade ... ... .... ...  Brigadier-General Kinloch. 
» SB o wimg 5 Rant ne , i Waterfield. 
» 2% (Derajat) to 3rd Brigade Gatacre. 
The batteries having come by march route instead of by rail, as was 
the case with the infantry, were probably the fittest troops on the ground 
at the time of concentration. 
3) 33 
The advance from Hoti Mardan commenced on Ist April when the 
2nd and 3rd Brigades marched to Jalala (14 miles) while the Ist went 
to Lundkhawar to make a feint against the Shahkot Pass. 
On 2nd April the 2nd Brigade marched to Dirgai at the north of the 
gorge leading to the Malakand Pass while the other brigades encamped 
a few miles away, the Ist still heading for the Shahkot Pass. 
On 8rd April the 2nd Brigade moved out at 8 a.m. to attack the 
Malakand, both batteries from the other brigades haying come up to 
join it before it marched. 
General Low’s plans had been kept profoundly secret. Until the 
last moment the whole force thought that an attack was also to be made 
on the Shahkot Pass by the Ist Brigade while the 3rd Brigade was to 
remain in rear, ready to support either of the others if necessary. 
In reality the movement of the lst Brigade were merely a feint and 
they eventually came up and reinforced the 2nd at the Malakand. 
I suppose it was owing to the closeness of this secrecy that the C.R.A. 
was left at the base, in ignorance that his three batteries were to be 
-brigaded together on 3rd April. 
