4th April 
504, THE ARTILLERY IN CHITRAL. 
I controlled the fire from a hill peak, having one battery on my right 
and two on my left and used my voice for orders, first calling attention 
by the whistle. I found it very advantageous to have men from each 
battery on the flanks nearest me, watching me for orders and calling 
the attention of Battery Commanders when I wanted them to hear, 
At no time were infantry firing nearer than 600 yards; had they been 
nearer the task of controlling the fire of three batteries in the way 
I did would have been most difficult, if not impossible. A Maxim gun 
that occasionally fired near us completely drowned my voice. The three 
batteries occupied a front of 300 to 350 yards. When the enemy was 
driven out of all sungurs on the hillside and our infantry were near the 
top, the fire of all three batiteries was concentrated on the village. The 
shells burst most regularly. 
At the second position No. 8 Mountain Battery, R.A. fired at a large 
sungur on the top of the hill on the left about 2000 feet above the 
battery. Range 2525 yards. The third shell struck the top of the 
wall and the three following did likewise. Trails had to be sunk inthe 
ground to get the necessary elevation.” 
I accompanied the infantry at the assault of the hill and I particularly 
noticed the absolute confidence that they placed in the accuracy of 
artillery fire and observation. The possibility of danger from that 
quarter never seemed to strike anyone though many of the shells 
sounded unpleasantly close, and [admitthat I, personally, had occasional 
reminiscenses of incidents while on range duty such as bad fuzes. Cer- 
tainly a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. 
(‘) “Had it not been for the heavy shelling which the position 
underwent from the three batteries of artillery, the final assault would 
have been infinitely more troublesome. The effect of the shrapnel fire 
was very deadly and far-reaching. Not only in the sungurs, but in the 
village and for some distance beyond it were traces of the terrible way 
in which it had done its work.” 
The expenditure of ammunition was :— 
Ring. Shrapnel. 
ENORS! cinstdietee teens HASH eee Ge aL 
ins he Re 11 HORRY Sore AOI Rote Beet Betta 69 
op 2 (Demee) —co0 BO cn o0p-000st(iéC NL 
After the pass had been forced, the three batteries ascended the hill 
and bivouacked on the top with the Ist Brigade. The ascent was 
terribly difficult and the road was much blocked. ‘The Derajat battery 
took three hours to reach the top. Hardly any of the transport got up 
that night and comparatively little the next day, so those bivouacking 
on the summit of the hill had a very rough experience, suffering as they 
did from cold, hunger and fatigue. 
On 4th April No. 8 Mountain Battery accompanied the Ist Brigade 
which moved on to Khar in the Swat valley—about four miles. They 
were attacked on the way and came in for some sharp fighting. Indeed 
it is considered that the enemy were in greater force and sustained 
heavier losses than on the previous day. On this occasion they were 
1 Morning Post. 
