14th to 16th 
April. 
17th April. 
508 THE ARTILLERY IN CHITRAL. 
tured Pathan gave the following story. . . . ‘Hven the severe handling 
by the supporting force did not stay them and, at nightfall, 3000 were 
waiting in the cornfields for the signal to rush the camp. But suddenly 
the night was turned into day, and then again and again, and our 
courage forsook us.’ The ‘night into day’ was the effect of the star 
shell which the Derajat battery sent over them. And thus the Guides 
were saved from a tight place.” 
At daybreak, on the 14th, the enemy were seen to be still in force, 
but, after keeping up a heavy fire for about twenty minutes, in the 
course of which Captain Peebles was mortally wounded, they melted 
away altogether. In the action and during the night and morning 
following the expenditure of ammunition was :— 
Ring. Shrapnel. Star, 
INO, 8 dulommawayin ISAC E sab. sab vebg db® cos + boon a Sb vpoam aces = 
No, 2 (Dewar) Momo Bailey 51, == con ono JB a0 oo. 
The Derajat battery remained covering the Guides’ camp from 18th 
to loth without kits or shelter of any kind, and, as there was a great 
deal of heavy rain on those days, they had anything but a comfortable 
time. 
On 14th April No. 3 Mountain Battery, who were at Khar, received 
orders suddenly at 3.40 p.m. to march without delay and join the 2nd 
Brigade at Sado. They were off by 5 p.m. and marched that night to 
Chakdarra, about 8 miles, crossing the Swat river. Next day (15th) 
they marched 24 miles to Sado where they arrived full of go at about 
3 p.m.—a pretty smart performance over bad roads. 
No further advance was made till the 17th when the 2nd and 8rd 
Brigades crossed the Panjkora by the new suspension bridge. From 
this time the lead was taken by the 8rd Brigade. After marching afew 
miles in the direction of Mundia (Umra Khan’s headquarters) they 
came in sight of a very numerous enemy. 
The passage of troops over the bridge had been very slow as infantry 
had to cross in single file while, in the case of mules, only three were 
allowed to be, at one time, on the bridge which had a span of 95 feet. 
Consequently it was almost mid-day before the action commenced. 
There was some misunderstanding about the succession in which 
troops were to cross, and I believe it was by a piece of simple luck that 
the Derajat battery went over ahead of the other batteries. 
From the bridge to the place where our troops assumed fighting 
formation was about six miles and the battery did most of this distance 
at the trot, a pace of manceuyre not generally recognized in Mountain 
Artillery, in order to catch up the infantry who had got a long start of 
them from the bridge. I happened to be standing near the Headquarter 
Staff when it was reported to General Gatacre that the battery was 
coming up and general astonishment was expressed at the rapidity with 
which they had covered the ground. 
The action—called Mamagai—was not a very sanguinary affair as the 
enemy appeared to have but little stomach for the fight and, although 
they were possibly in greater force than on any previous occasion, they 
kept ata discreet distance and offered a very tame opposition to the 
advance of our infantry. 
