ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY IN CUBA. 553 
system that the fuze should be screwed into the shell 
instead of being pressed in, and that the hand-grenade 
should be projected either by hand or by means of tubes 
or troughs. The bursting charge should be 384 oz. of 
R.F.G. powder. very small detached work or post 
should be furnished with a supply of these missiles. 
(2.) It being a recognised axiom of war that troops destined for 
the attack should march by different roads and combine 
for joint action, it is necessary that the various columns 
should be in perfect communication with each other. For 
this object the telegraph, telephone, and signalling either 
by sound or vision are the surest means to employ. In 
Cuba, however, the conditions are such that visual signal- 
ling is probably the only means at the disposal of the 
troops for keeping up communication. He then describes 
the American ‘‘ Very” pistol and signal rockets. The 
former is adopted at the present time in the United States 
army and navy and in the Italian army,! and is a breech- 
loading central-fire pistol. The pistol discharges red and 
green stars, and by means of combining the two colours 
and adopting longer or shorter series of lights a code of 
signals is readily formed for use at night. The Italians 
also use smoke rockets for use during the day. The 
signals with these depends on the degree of the intensity 
of the smoke, and the rockets also emit a considerable 
sound by means of a petard which they enclose. 
Colonel Vidal recommends, therefore, that each work of de- 
fence should be furnished with a proportion of signal 
rockets for use during the daytime; and for use at night 
he recommends for each defended post a “ Very” pistol 
with a supply of cartridges. 
Similarly all the operating columns should be furnished with 
“Very” pistols and signal rockets for night and day use 
in conjunction with the forts or other works of defence. 
In all these works also there should be a supply of torches 
and light-balls for aiding the defence if attacked at night. 
(3.) In certain special cases the author advocates the use of trains 
armed with field guns as was done by the English in the 
Egyptian campaign. ‘To support this proposal he quotes 
an incident of the campaign in Cuba, when in June last 
a Spanish officer in command of a detachment embarked 
250 men in a train and started down the line to attack a 
force of the enemy which was reported as being in the 
vicinity of a factory not far off. The insurgents, 800 
strong, were conveniently drawn up in a semicircular 
formation to receive the train, and while disembarking 
the men some considerable losses were caused. Once 
1 Also in the British Royal Navy I believe, 
