

*Védánta-Sara, or Essence of the Védánta, an introduction into the Védánta Philosophy by Sadánanda Parivrákáchárya, translated from the original Sanscrit by E. ROER, Librarian to the Asiatic Society of Bengal.*

## PREFACE.

Of the Védánta-Sara two translations have already been published, one by Mr. Ward, (in his work View of the History, Literature and Mythology of the Hindoos) and the other in the German language, by the late Professor O. Frank. Ward's translation, which is evidently not taken from the Sanscrit, is very far from conveying a fair likeness of the original to the reader, and I need only quote the opinion of Colebrooke with regard to it, to prove its entire failure as a correct rendering of the original\*.

The German for which we are indebted to O. Frank, was published together with the original text, in 1835 ; but, however creditable it is to the author, it is also inexact as a translation. Although a good Sanscrit scholar, and one of the first in Europe, who devoted his talents to that language, he had to struggle with the difficulty of ascertaining the real value of its technical terms, a difficulty which he had hardly the means of removing ; for in Professor Wilson's excellent Sanscrit Dictionary, only a few philosophical terms are explained, and without an explanation of such terms by pundits, or an extensive course of reading, the

\* Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society Vol. II, p. 9. note. Mr. Ward has given, in the fourth volume of his View of the History, Literature and Mythology of the Hindoos (third edition,) a translation of the Védánta-Sara. I wish to speak as gently as I can of Mr. Ward's performance, but having collated this, I am bound to say, it is no version of the original text, and seems to have been made from an oral exposition through the medium of a different language, probably the Bengalese. This will be evident to the Oriental Scholar on the slightest comparison, for example the introduction, which does not correspond with the original in so much as a single word, the name of the author's preceptor alone excepted ; nor is there a word of the translated introduction countenanced by any of the commentaries. At the commencement of the treatise too, where the requisite qualifications of a student are enumerated, Mr. Ward makes his author say, that a person, possessing those qualifications, is an heir to the Veda ; there is no term in the text, nor in the commentaries, which could suggest the notion of heir, unless Mr. Ward has so translated *adhicari*, (a competent or qualified person) which in Bengalese signifies proprietor, or with the epithet *uttara*, *uttara adhicari*, heir or successor. It would be needless to pursue the comparison further. The meaning of the original is certainly not to be gathered from such translations as this, and (as Mr. Ward terms them) of other principal works of the Hindoos, which he has presented to the public.

exact metaphysical meaning of them must remain problematical. Besides O. Frank is the disciple of a particular philosophical school, that of Hegel, and has very often coloured the ideas of the original so as to correspond with his own system. I hope, therefore, that I have not undertaken a useless task, in bringing before the public a third translation, in which it has been my constant endeavor to render the original as faithfully as possible. For the language of this translation, I have as a foreigner to solicit the indulgence of the reader ; and, independently of other considerations, it will be remembered, that English in itself presents difficulties, in rendering with exactitude the real force and meaning of Sanscrit philosophical terms. As regards, however, the language of the preface, I am much indebted to the valuable assistance of Mr. H. Torrens, V. P. and Secretary to the Asiatic Society, and I take this opportunity of acknowledging my great obligations to him.

In publishing this translation, it is my principal object to attract the attention of the public once more to a branch of Hindoo learning, which, successfully cultivated as it was by Colebrooke, has been of late almost entirely neglected. The researches of that eminent scholar, as in other departments, were also with regard to the philosophy of the Hindoos, of the most comprehensive character. He not only gave a general sketch of the different systems of their philosophy, but also a critical introduction into this branch of Hindoo literature, almost entirely unknown before his day. As his labors then created extensive interest in Europe, it is much to be regretted, that these researches were afterwards but lamely followed up. The Germans indeed did as much as the want of material allowed them. I here allude to the researches of the two Schlegels (Fr. and A. W. von) W. V. Humboldt, Ritter, (in his History of Philosophy) O. Frank, Lassen and others, who published either original texts, or translations, or critical treatises. But however meritorious these labors were, most of them, as founded upon Colebrooke's works, could not much enlarge our information on Hindoo philosophy. For this object the publication of Sanscrit texts, or translations was necessary, which were looked for chiefly from India and England. Here, however, it appears, that the interest in Hindoo philosophy was only enforced by the name of Colebrooke, as with him almost all further investigation ceased ; for, with the exception of Professor Wilson, who edited Colebrooke's translation of the Sankhya

Karika, and translated the native commentaries on this work, no one has published any work of importance with regard to Hindoo philosophy. Without endeavoring here to enlarge on the causes of this neglect, I must not omit to touch on the principal one—the want of encouragement, with which philosophical researches are met in England. The study of philosophy is of its very nature adapted but to few; but even they will be deterred from it, if that part of the public, to which they are to communicate the results of their enquiries, is totally indifferent to them. If philosophy generally be but in little repute in England, it is easy to conclude, what must be the neglect of the systems of the Hindoos in particular, which, it appears, are entirely superseded by the much more elaborate systems of Europe. The Hindoos, it is said, are acute enough in nominal distinctions, but their enquiries, originating from an absurd and gross superstition, recur only to this root, instead of explaining the phenomena of nature. Without entering into a full discussion of this subject, I may be allowed to observe, that this view would at once destroy all historical study. On account of their historical interest, we not only direct our attention to the works of Grecian art, but also to those of Egypt, Etruria, Persia, Peru and of other countries, because they show us the characters of those nations in different states of civilization. If these possess a general interest, Hindoo philosophy is a monument, which must claim the attention of every enquiring mind, as it reveals to us the inmost character of the nation, closely interwoven as it is with all institutions of public and domestic life, with their literature, religion and their views of the means, by which their moral welfare might be advanced or retarded. But waiving this general interest, we must be aware of the connexion of Hindoo philosophy with the development of European science, by the new platonic philosophy, which evidently contains the principles and results of Hindoo philosophy, a connexion which can be only fully understood, when we know more of the history of the Hindoo systems.\*

The *Védánta-Sara* is an abstract of the doctrines of the *Védánta* philosophy, and expounds more particularly those tenets which are ascribed by Colebrooke to the modern branch of this school. It comprehends in a very condensed form the whole range of the topics, which are discussed more fully in the different works of this school. The ob-

\* Ritter's *Geschichte der Philosophie*. Vol. 4, p. 44.

scurity, which prevails in some passages, is rather owing to the concentration than to the indistinctness of the ideas. The principles of the system are clearly laid down, and though in a few passages there is a deviation from them, they are never lost sight of. Other philosophical systems are only touched upon, when it is the object to prove their principles to be entirely inconsistent with themselves and with each other. The demonstrations, though short, are perspicuous, and sometimes even elegant. The illustrations are generally well selected and striking; and, if we consider the work to be rather of a descriptive than of a argumentative character, we must acknowledge, that it is a most excellent introduction to the study of that philosophy.

The following exposition is intended to place before the reader the chief metaphysical topics of this work and to compare the doctrines, explained in it, with those philosophical systems, Hindoo as well as European, with which it has an affinity in its principles. There exists according to it only one eternal and unchangeable being, who has the attributes of existence and consciousness. The manifold distinctions in what may be called, the material and intellectual worlds, are together with those worlds, mere *εἶδωλα*, produced by unconsciousness,\* (which objective is something analogous with matter, and subjective a want of clear perception of the unreality of all material objects.) For example, if you reflect on the reality of the world, you find it has none, because it is changeable throughout; all reality is centred in one being, who is beyond change, and concerning whom there is not even change or plurality of ideas, as it includes no distinctions in itself. Thus of the supposed reality of the world, nothing remains; naught exists but mere *εἶδωλα*, which, in contradistinction with the knowledge of Brahma (or of the infinite being without plurality,) may be called ignorance or unconsciousness. It is the principal work of philosophy to destroy this ignorance, or to unite our finite being with the infinite Brahma, or in the words of the Védánta, to know ourselves as Brahma. It

\* The words consciousness and unconsciousness do not express the full meaning of the corresponding Sanscrit words. Consciousness means the knowledge of what passes in the mind, that is, a reflected knowledge, while the Sanscrit term refers to knowledge in general. As Colebrooke, however, has used in his essay those words, I thought it better not to introduce another terminology, and have only to remind the reader, that consciousness and unconsciousness are here always to be understood in the more comprehensive sense.

is, however, impossible for any individual immediately to obtain this true knowledge, as any idea, which we may conceive of Brahma, previous to the performance of the conditions, conducive to that knowledge, must be one of the various illusions, which are created by ignorance in our minds. The true knowledge can only be obtained by a systematic method, which is twofold, theoretical and practical. The theoretical method is the direction of there flective power upon Brahma, and it proceeds first synthetically from the infinite substance to the εἶδωλα or appearances, showing the various modes, in which Brahma is successively represented by unconsciousness; and secondly analytically, from the manifold creations of unconsciousness to the infinite substance, successively showing the unreality of them and returning to Bramha as the only source of reality. The practical method presents the means, by which our senses, passions, and thoughts are subdued; the mind is gradually detached from worldly concerns, directed to the performance of good acts alone, and finally fixed upon the contemplation of God.

It is remarkable, how in the principle itself the fallacy of the system is manifest. If Bramha be the only real being, all other things (material or immaterial) are unreal, and this inference is expressly recognized, there should be not even the appearance of an existence of them; but it is also said, that those things must not be considered as nothing; so that they have, to say so, a kind of imperfect existence, but still an existence, which cannot be derived from the infinite Bramha. In short, there is not *one* principle, but, against the express assertion of the Védánta, *two* principles, the infinite, unchangeable, omniscient being, and the finite, changeable and unconscious being. This is also evident from the consequences; for the world or its appearance is not produced either by Bramha or by unconsciousness, but by their mutual causality; for in Bramha only, when clouded by the mists of ignorance, is the spectacle of a world produced. According to this exposition of the theory, which must, I think, be allowed to be correct, Bramha would coincide with the notion, which occidental philosophers form of substance, and unconsciousness with that of attributes and modes.

What is called unconsciousness, has, however, a twofold meaning; according to one, it is delusive appearance, by which unreal things are represented as real; according to the other, it is the origin of the actual world. We shall consider only this second meaning, which we

will endeavour clearly to define. It is evident, that an adequate notion of that origin can only be obtained from its productions, as the nature of the cause is perceived by the nature of its effects, and this mode of inference we may the more insist upon, as the inductive process is recommended by the system as one of the means, whereby to arrive at true knowledge. Now the Védántists hold, that unconsciousness causes the emanation of five elements, ether (*ákása*,) air, fire, water and earth. These elements, though subtile and imperceptible to the senses, have material qualities, and are therefore themselves special kinds of matter. To know their origin, we have then to divest them of their special qualities, by which we arrive at the notion of matter in general (separated from all differences of space and time,) and we must therefore say, that unconsciousness and the general notion of matter are virtually the same, a necessary inference, however, but one which the Védántists took care to avoid, because the vague notion of unconsciousness suited admirably as a cloak to the radical error of their system.

As it is here my object to place before the reader the most prominent characteristics only of the system, I am not to enter into the various emanations from unconsciousness, but will at once state the opinion, which the Védánta forms as to the highest form of knowledge, to which the individual mind can aspire, and which in fact is a consequence, necessarily derived from the first principles of the system. When we have perceived, that all the emanations of unconsciousness are unreal, when we are able to distinguish in the universal as well as in the individual soul, that which is real and eternal from the unreal and the transient, then is our notion of Bramha firmly and adequately established, in the knowledge, that the individual soul is the same with the eternal Bramha, as the differences, which at first sight seemed to exist between them, became gradually destroyed by the progress of reflection. But even this adequate notion of Bramha, as an act of the mind, is included in the emanations of unconsciousness, and it is therefore an unavoidable inference, that this act also, when once arrived at, should be destroyed as one, though the purest and highest, of the emanations of unconsciousness, when the individual soul, comprehending its reality, returns to Bramha, with whom it is identical.

The philosophy of the Védánta, as explained in the Védánta-Sara, differs undoubtedly from the more ancient expositions of this doctrine,

and I fully concur in Colebrooke's opinion, that the attempt to proclaim the material world as mere illusion, had not originated with the founders of the Védánta. The centre on which all Hindoo philosophy depends, is the opposition between the phenomena of the mind and of the body, by which they were led even in early times, as it appears, to maintain the existence of two principles, soul and matter.\* This is likewise observable in the Védánta; soul and matter, though produced from one and the same substance, are at first real productions, which have the same claim to existence, and only at a later period, when on comparison of both with the substantia absoluta their reality came to be questioned, the reality of matter was denied, and the expedient of an illusion was resorted to, in order to explain its existence.

The Védánta in general differs from the Sankhya; the two systems assimilate *in their explanation of productions of the material world*; but while the Sankhya lays down the original independent existence of spirit and of matter, the Védánta derives both from one and the same substance, in which their differences are destroyed. The two schools of the Védánta, the ancient and modern, agree as to this substantia absoluta; the material productions, however, derived from it, though created in the same successive order, are differently explained; they are real productions according to the ancient school, while the modern one believes them to be a mere illusion, produced by unconsciousness.

Among the various systems of the Greeks, we can only find that of the Eleates, with which we may compare the principles of the Védánta. We there perceive the same all comprehensive substance, which has the same attribute of eternal, unchangeable existence which is without differences, either with regard to itself or others, and the sole attribute of which is thought. We also find in the disputes of the Eleate Zeno with other Greek philosophers the same inclination to consider all material things as mere illusion. But I abstain from further comparison of the systems, as the Védánta treats of the subject matter synthetically as well as by analysis, whereas the Eleate school has confined itself wholly to the latter process.

The modern Védánta bears the closest affinity to the system of Spi-

\* Though it appears a matter of course, that all philosophers should commence from these principles, history shows the reverse. Thus, Greek philosophy was at its commencement entirely physical.

noza. His Bramha is that infinite substance with infinite attributes, beside which there is nought else existing, though he so far differs from the modern Védántists as to assign to it two attributes, that of thought, and that of extension, which the Védántists of that school deny the existence of.

They maintain a perfect Ens or a real unity without any element of opposite qualities. Spinoza indeed asserts, that his Ens Cogitans is identical with the Ens Extensum, difference existing only in the perception of the whole under the one or under the other attribute; but on the other hand he also asserts, that each attribute must be understood of itself, that is to say, that it has no relation whatever to any other attribute.\* Though the Védánta philosophy in this instance is evidently more strict in the definition of the principle, it deviates from the original purity of its notion, when attempting to explain the phenomena of its world.

Both systems present likewise a singular coincidence in the mode, by which they connect finite things with infinite substance. Spinoza declares it altogether impossible to derive finite things from infinite substance, because any finite substance is only finite, if determined by another substance of the same kind, that is, infinite substance is always co-existent with finite things.† The Védánta-Sara maintains also, that the perception of Bramha as one whole or as many parts, depends merely on the accident of that perception; if perceived as one, it would be one; if perceived as many, it would be many; but in the latter case the unity of entity would be in no sort destroyed or altered. Here likewise we find a plurality of material objects, not derived from the one whole (which has the attributes of infinity, eternity, &c.) but co-existent in it, so

\* Though it should be hardly necessary to make quotations in such a general sketch as this, still it may be not found useless to confirm some of the above assertions. Per attributum intelligo id, quod intellectum de substantia percipit, tanquam ejus essentiam constituens. Spin. Eth. I. Def. 4. Unumquodque unius substantiæ attributum per se concipi debet. Eth. Prop. 10. Duæ attributa, realiter distincta, per se concipiuntur, idest, unum sine ope alterius. Eth. Def. 3.

† Quodcunque singulare sive quavis res, quæ finita est et determinatam hæbet existentiam, non potest existere nec ad operandum determinari, nisi ad existendum et operandum determinetur ab alia causa, quæ etiam finita est, et determinatam habet existentiam; et rursus hæc causam non potest etiam existere, neque ad operandum determinari, nisi ab alia, quæ etiam finita est et determinetur ad existendum et operandum, et sic in infinitum. Eth. I. Prop. 28.

that both views are essentially the same: this way of reasoning, however, must not be applied to the pure Bramha. Here then both systems differ, and if we must assign to the Védánta the meed of greater purity in its principle, we must expressly state, that in the development of the system Spinoza is as infinitely superior to the Védánta as the science of his time was to that of the Hindoos generally.

It is easy also to find many points of resemblance between the modern Védánta and the doctrines of Fichte\* and Schelling; as the world, being a production of Maya, or unconsciousness, and according to Fichte, being a phenomenon of the Ego in its different modes of considering itself, and Schelling's negation of the nothing by the absolute substance, his absolute Selbstbejahung, compared with the infinite Bramha, without whom nothing exists, are ideas closely related; but we abstain from further comparisons and conclude this introduction with some remarks on Hindoo philosophy in general.

We must acknowledge the ingenuity and originality of thought, by which this system was brought forth. It is evidently not a primitive notion of the mind, such as might almost arbitrarily assign a general cause to certain phenomena, which provoke reflection. It is an elaborate system, in which the principle and the method are clearly defined, and the inferences are fairly deduced, and compared with the original impulses, by which reflection was called forth. It is also evident, that such a doctrine, especially as it was considered as the last goal of perfection by all classes, must have had a powerful influence in the formation of individual character as well as on the civilisation of the people; for to obtain its final object, purity of the moral character was indispensable. It is, to confess the truth, a philosophical system, elevated, far above the crude notions, connected with national superstitions, above the prejudices of caste, as well as above the formalities of ceremonial worship; for the supreme substance is only known by a continued

\* Fichte, in asserting that the external objects are merely productions of the ego, appears to be most closely connected with the modern Védánta. This is, however, not the case. The Védántists maintain the world to be appearance, because it cannot be considered as real: Fichte, on the contrary, from its being a mere appearance in the Ego, argues its unreality. This Ego moreover, as the identity of subject and object, is very different from any doctrine in the Védánta, and the idealistic principle, from which it appears to proceed, is only pretended, as the phenomena of nature are in fact derived from a realistic basis.

and methodical direction of the reflective power of the mind upon it, and the Sankhya expressly asserts, that the religious ceremonies and doctrines of the Védas are not sufficient] for final salvation.\* It is, however, not surprising, that similar effects were not produced by the philosophy of the Hindoos, as by that of the Greeks. In Greece no caste existed; men of science rose from all classes of the people, and the work of the higher faculties of the mind was not restricted to the priests. When therefore philosophers found the religious doctrines of their people inconsistent with sound reason and morality, they did not hesitate to pronounce them as such, and to demonstrate their pernicious effects upon the moral and religious principles of the people.† In India, on the contrary, the cultivation of science was incumbent on the priests alone, and if the results of their enquiries were strongly opposed to the religious prejudices of the people, their whole position most forcibly recommended them to conceal what they considered truths, because destructive of those very prejudices, whence they derived their privileges and subsistence. Thus influenced on the one side by the power of truth to the revelation of their opinions, on the other by worldly advantages to their concealment, they followed a middle course, that is, they endeavored to reconcile the tenets of religion with their philosophical views, without deserting the consistency of their principles. By this proceeding must religion, of course have been degraded from its state of sublime agency, as advancing the best interests of mankind, to becoming the base instrument of delusion on uncultivated minds, while philosophy lost its dignity and genuine character, being mixed up with a corrupt theology, and the distance between the learned and the people in general became the wider. It was only one of the consequences of such a position, that the common people by nature and law were unfit to enjoy the knowledge possessed by the privileged castes. Owing to the exclusiveness of science it is another consequence, that philosophy in India was more directed to theoretical contemplation than to practical purposes; the Greeks as well as the modern European

\* This is in fact also maintained by the Védánta, absorption into Brahma being the final end of an individual intelligence, and all efforts which are not directed to this end, retarding it in a more or less degree.

† Sextus Empir. Adv. Math., where he speaks about Xenophanes, and Clem. Alex. Chrom. V. Xenophanes; but the principal passage, and perhaps the best, what has been said on the pernicious results of polytheism, Plat. Repub. Lib. II.

nations, on the contrary, bestowed the same attention upon practical as on abstract questions; for while, according to the one, it is a duty of mankind to remain in social connexion, a duty which should even be enforced, it is, according to the other, the highest privilege of the wise to separate himself from all social connexions, to endeavour at a total abdication of the impulses and motives for action, which the world or our ownselves can present, until the soul has arrived at that condition, in which it returns to the source of all truth and reality, and in which the individual becomes annihilated by absorption into the great origin of all things, who is all, and in whom all are included.

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*Salutation to Ganéshta.*

For the accomplishment of my desire I take refuge to the soul, infinite in reality, in knowledge and in bliss,\* the place of the universe, which neither by word nor thought can be approached.

Having worshipped my teacher *Adwyánanda*,† who by overcoming the notion of duality, is in truth so named, I shall expound the Essence of the Védánta according to my understanding.

The name of Védánta applies to such arguments as are taken from Védánta. the Upanishads‡ to the Shárírikasutras§ and other similar Shastras, which tend to the same end.

As this work is an introduction to the Védánta, it need not separately explain the categories, by which the Védánta is अनुबन्धः completed. There are four categories in the Védánta, the qualified person, the object, the connection, and the final end.

\* This may also be translated, "the infinite, eternal, omniscient, blissful soul," or "the soul, which is the bliss of infinite being, and knowledge." I here observe, that the soul is not something different from those predicates, but the identity of reality, knowledge and bliss.

† Adwyánanda means who finds his felicity in non-duality.

‡ Upanishad, the theological part of the Vedánta, or argumentative part of the Védas. Wilson. The commentator, Rámakrishna Tírtha remarks, that it is the object of the Upanishads to explain the unity of the universal and the individual soul.

§ The Sárírika, Mímánsa, Brahme-sútra or Sáríra-sútra, above mentioned, is a collection of succinct aphorisms, attributed to Bádaráyana, who is the same with Vyása, or Védavyása, also called Dwaipáyana or Crishna-dwaipáyana. Colebrooke, Tr. R. A. Soc. Vol. II, p. 3.

A qualified person is he, who by the perusal, as it is prescribed, *Qualified person.* of the Védas and Védángas having first obtained अधिकारी the *true* sense of all the Védas, who in this or a former life having renounced the objects of desire, and the works which are *forbidden*, who by observing the daily ceremonies as well as those prescribed on certain occasions, the expiations and acts of internal worship, being liberated from all sin, and therefore thoroughly purified in his mind, and who having performed the four means, has become perfect in knowledge.

Objects of desire, as for instance the Jyótishtómas\*, are such as are *Objects of desire.* means of obtaining heaven and other desirable objects; prohibited is what causes (the punishment of) hell and other undesirable objects, as for instance the killing of a Bramhan. Daily ceremonies are for instance the *Shandhyábandana*† which to omit is the cause of sin. Ceremonies on certain occasions are for instance the *Jatéshtya* and others for the birth of a son. Expiations are for instance the *Chandráyanas*,‡ which are causes of removing sin. Acts of internal worship, for instance such as originated from *Shandilya*, are actions of the mind, whose object is *Bramha*, united with the three qualities. The principal fruit of the daily ceremonies is the purification of the mind, that of the acts of internal worship is the fixing of the mind upon *Bramha*.

“It is him, whom the Bramhans by the word of the Védas and by religious austerities wish to comprehend,” says the *Sruti*.

“By austerities sin is destroyed; by knowledge, immortality obtained,” says the *Sruti*.

\* A particular sacrifice, at which sixteen officiating priests are required. *Wilson's Sanscrit Dict.*

† Religious abstraction, meditation, repetition of Mantras, sipping of water, &c to be performed by the three first classes of Hindoos at particular and stated periods in the course of every day, especially at sunrise, sunset, and also, though not essentially, at noon. *Wil. S. D.*

‡ A religious or expiatory observance regulated by the moon's age, diminishing the daily consumption of food every day by one mouthful, for the dark half of the moon, and increasing it in like manner during the light half. *Wil. S. D.*

The secondary fruit of the daily ceremonies, of those enjoined on certain occasions, and of the acts of internal worship, is the gaining of the world of the forefathers and of the celestials.

“ By works the first is obtained, by knowledge the latter,” says the Sruti.

Means are : First, the distinction of the real from the unreal thing ;  
 Means. Secondly, the disregard of the enjoyment of fruits  
**साधनानि** (arising from works) as well in this as in a future life ;  
 Thirdly, tranquillity of mind, self-restraint, &c. ; Fourthly, the desire  
 of emancipation.

The distinction of the real from the unreal thing, is to know, that  
**नित्यानित्य** Bramha is the real thing, and beside him all is  
**वस्तु विवेकः** unreal. Disregard of the enjoyment of the fruits,  
 arising from works, in this as well as in a future  
*Distinction of the real* life, is entirely to renounce the enjoyment of  
*from the unreal thing.* things of this world, as for instance, of wreaths or  
*Disregard of enjoy-* sandelwood, &c. which are transient, because they  
*ment in this as well as in* must be obtained by works, as well as to renounce  
*another world.* the enjoyment of things of another world, as for instance, of the juice of  
 immortality, &c., because they are also transient.

Means of self-command are, *a.* tranquillity of mind, *b.* self-restraint, *c.*  
*Means of self-command.* resting, *d.* endurance, *e.* religious contemplation  
*Tranquillity of mind.* and *f.* faith. Tranquillity of mind is the refraining

**शमः** of the mind from objects of the ear and the other  
 senses, with the exception of such objects as refer to Bramha, (Bramha  
 as united with the three qualities) self-restraint is the coercion of the

*Self-restraint.* external senses from all objects, with the exception  
**दमः** of such as refer to Bramha. Resting is to rest from  
 Resting. all objects, when returning (into the mind) with  
**उपरतिः** exception of such as refer to Bramha, or to abandon,  
 according to prescribed rules, all works that are enjoined. Endurance

*Endurance.* is the sustaining of cold and warm, and of all those  
**सहिष्णुता** sensations that have their contrary ones.

Religious contemplation is to keep the mind fixed upon the hearing  
*Religious contemplation.* &c. of Bramha, and upon such objects by which  
**समाधिः** this is facilitated. Faith is belief in the words

of the spiritual guide and of the Védánta. Desire of emancipation is the wish of liberation. He that is perfect in knowledge, having obtained this state of mind, is called a qualified person.

*Faith.*

**अथा**  
*Desire of emancipation*

**मुमुक्षुत्वं**

“Tranquil in mind and self-restrained,” says the Sruti, and it is also observed, “To him who is tranquil in his mind, who has subdued his senses, whose sins are removed, who acts according to the precepts (of the Shastra) who abounds in virtues, who is a follower of the teacher and strives for emancipation, to such a one must always this (the Shastra) be given.”

II. *Object*, (of the Védánta,) is the unity of the sentient soul and of Bramha, the soul in its pure state, as to be proved from arguments of the Védánta.

**विषयः**

III. *Connection*, between that unity as object of knowledge, and the Upanishads which explain it, is the relation

**सम्बन्धः**

between the object of knowledge and that which makes it known.

IV. *Final end*. Final end. The destruction of the ignorance which obtains with regard to the knowledge of that unity (of the individual and universal soul) and the gaining

**प्रयोजनं**

of beatitude in accordance with his (Bramhás) being.

“Who knows the soul, overcomes misery,” says the Sruti, and further,

“Who knows Bramha, becomes like Bramha.”

That qualified person, being burned by the fire of birth, death and other worldly misery, as a person whose head is burning, takes refuge in the sea, repairs with offerings in his hand to the teacher who knows the Védas, and puts his faith in Bramha, and becomes his (the teacher's) follower.

“Holding (he) offerings in his hands, (repairs) to him who knows the Védas, and puts his faith in Bramha,” says the Sruti.

II. *Object*. That teacher with deepest love instructs him by means of the improper transferring and of the true abstraction.\*

“To him, when arrived, thus spoke the teacher,” says the Sruti.

\* Adhyárópa (the same with Arópa, Adhyásha, Bhrama) is literally “placing upon,” and signifies error with regard to the infinite being.

*Improper transferring* is the placing of an unreal thing upon *Improper transferring*. the real thing, as the placing of (the notion of)

अध्यारोपः

a snake upon a rope, which is not a snake.

The real thing is the eternal, omniscient, blissful Bramha, without *Real and unreal thing.* duality. The unreal thing is all, that is in-

वस्त्ववस्तु

animate without consciousness.\* The thing

अज्ञानं

without consciousness is according to some what

*Thing without consci-  
ousness.*

cannot be explained by (the ideas of) exis-

tence or non-existence, according to others, the something, composed of the three qualities,† which exists, and ob-

structs knowledge.

I am ignorant, this and the like you perceive by reflection, and

*Unity and multiplicity  
of the thing without  
consciousness.*

“you know the power of the soul, in which its own qualities are inherent,” says the Sruti. This

(something) without consciousness by the ideas

of generality and speciality is perceived as one thing and many things. For as by the application of (the idea) of generality to trees the word forest in the singular number is perceived, or by the same notion

\* Vide preface.

† गुणः Commonly translated, quality, but more adequately degree of material existence. Guna is likewise here in the text not a quality of the thing without consciousness, but the three Gunas are its actual being. A Guna, as being the source of all derived material existence, can consequently not be explained, but by its effects. Lassen renders these three modes of existence by—essentia, impetus, and caligo. Colebrooke, Miscellaneous Essays, Vol. I. p. 249, says, with regard to them: “The Sankhya, as other Indian systems of philosophy, is much engaged with the consideration of what is termed the three qualities, if indeed quality is the proper import of the term; for the Scholiast of Capila understands it as meaning, not quality or accident, but substance, a modification, fettering the soul, conformably with another acceptation of Guna, signifying a cord. The first and highest is goodness, (sattwa.) It is alleviating, enlightening, attended with pleasure and happiness; and virtue predominates in it. In fire it is prevalent, wherefore flame ascends, and sparks fly upwards. In man, when it abounds, as it does in beings of a superior order, it is the cause of virtue. The second and middlemost is foulness or passion, (rajas or téjas.) It is active, urgent and variable, attended with evil and misery. In air it predominates, wherefore wind moves transversely. In living beings, it is the cause of vice. The third and lowest is darkness, (tamas.) It is heavy and obstructive, attended with sorrow, dullness and illusion. In earth and water it predominates, wherefore they fall or tend downwards. In living beings it is the cause of stolidity. These three qualities are not mere accidents of nature, but are of its essence, and enter into its composition. We speak of the qualities of nature, as we do of the trees of a forest,” says the Sānchya.

many waters appear as a single thing, so by the application of the idea of generality to the unconscious things which are united with sentient souls and manifested by (the idea of) plurality, they appear as one single thing.

“Which is not produced, which is one” (ignorance, Maya,) says the Sruti.

In this universality (of unconsciousness) by being the attribute of the perfect one, is the principal quality, viz. that of goodness, prevailing ; the soul in which this (universal unconsciousness) is inherent, and which has the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, supreme government and other perfections, which is manifested by (the notions of) existence and non-existence, which is the all-pervading cause of the world, is

*Supreme ruler.*

called the supreme ruler. His omniscience arises from manifesting all that is without consciousness.

**ईश्वरः**

“Who knows all, is omniscient,” says the Sruti.

This universality (of unconsciousness) is the causal organism (of the

*Causal organism.*

soul,) since it is the cause of the universe, it is

**कारणशरीरं**

the cause of blessedness, since it involves all bliss

and has the quality of covering like a case ; it is profound sleep, since it rests above all ; it is therefore said to be the place of destruction of the subtile and gross expanses.

As by the application of (the idea of) speciality a forest is perceived as trees in the plural number, or water as many waters, so by the application of (the idea of) speciality the universal unconsciousness appears as many unconscious things.

“Bramha is by his Mâyás manifold,” says the Sruti.

In this instance by the application of universality and speciality arises the name of universality and speciality, (of unconsciousness.) This speciality of unconsciousness, by its being an attribute of the single soul, has the principal quality of goodness in its impure state. The soul, in which this (special unconsciousness) is inherent, and which has therefore the attributes of ignorance, subjection and other imperfections, is called the

*Individual Intelligence.*

individual intelligence ;\* it has the attribute of

**मात्रः**

partial knowledge, since it manifests only one

\* I have rendered the Sanscrit term : **मात्रः** by individual intelligence. The adequate version would be : who knows only a little, which is, however, in fact the same with the idea of an individual intelligence.

unconscious thing ; it is not able to manifest many, because it has the quality of indistinctness\*. Since it (the special unconsciousness) is the cause of self†, and of other similar attributes, it is the causal organism (of the soul) as it includes all bliss, the case of blessedness, as it rests above all, profound sleep, therefore the place of destruction of the subtle and coarse organisms. In that state the supreme ruler and the individual intelligences enjoy by the subtle powers of unconsciousness, which are the manifestations of the soul, (perfect) blessedness.

“The individual intelligence, which is the same with the soul, enjoys bliss,” says the Sruti.

This is also confirmed by the fact, that one who awakes from sleep, makes the reflection,—Sleeping I was happy, I knew nothing.

There is no distinction between both the universality and speciality, (of unconsciousness) as there is none between forest and the trees, and water as one thing, and water as many waters. There is no distinction likewise between both, the supreme ruler and the individual intelligences, in which that universality and speciality are inherent, as there is none between the sky, which covers the forest and the trees, and between the sky which is reflected by the ocean and by many waters.

“That Ruler of all,” says the Sruti.

As there is for both the forest and the trees, and the sky, which is attributed to them, as well as the water and the waters, and the sky, reflected by them, another not attributed sky, which is the location of them, so is for both, the unconsciousness and the soul, in which it (the unconsciousness) is inherent, another soul which is not inherent, and which is called the fourth‡.

“They call him blessed, tranquil, without duality, the fourth,” says the Sruti.

\* This indistinctness is produced, according to the Tika, by the state in which the single soul is placed, viz., in which the first quality, being suppressed by the second and third qualities, cannot be clearly manifest.

† अहङ्कारः Self, more properly what produces self, the notion of egoity, the faculty or power to refer all perceptions and notions to a self, an ego.

‡ This term of the fourth will afterwards be explained.

This fourth, the soul in its pure state\*, if, like a burning iron-ball, not distinguished from the unconsciousness and the soul, in which it is inherent, is the literal meaning of the great sentence, (viz., that art thou, which the teacher first addresses to his pupil) if distinguished, it is the real meaning of the great sentence.

The unconsciousness possesses two powers, the covering and the illusive†. The unconsciousness, though finite, hides by its covering power the infinite, incorporeal soul, by obstructing the mind of the observer, in the same way, as even a small cloud covers the orb of the sun, which extends many miles, by obstructing the direction of the eye of the observer.

Thus it is said, "As an ignorant man, the eye of whom is covered by a cloud, thinks the sun to be covered by a cloud and without radiance, so the self as soul, which is infinite knowledge, appears before the eye of the ignorant as constrained in limits."

When the soul is covered by this power, then arises the impression of dominion, possession, happiness, misery and of other notions, connected with material things, as from a rope, which is not perceived to be a rope (which is covered by its own ignorance) the idea of a snake

is produced.—As the ignorance with regard to a rope, produces by its own power (the idea of) a snake and similar things upon a rope which is not perceived to be a rope (which is covered by its own ignorance) so shows the unconsciousness (ignorance) by its own power all the expanses of the universe upon the soul, which is covered by ignorance. This power is called the illusive power.

It is said, "The illusive power of ignorance creates the world from the internal organisms of Bramhá's egg."

\* That is to say, considered in its absolute state, in which all differences and attributes are annihilated, and which can only be expressed by the notions of infinite existence and knowledge.

† There is this difference between the two powers, the one is negative, there is an absence of truth, because it is concealed; the second, however, is a creative power, it creates appearances, illusions which claim to be realities; the term illusive does not fully express the Sanscrit word, but I did not find a more adequate one.

The soul, in which the ignorance with its two powers is inherent, is by its own principality the instrumental cause\* (निमित्तं) and by the principality of its quality (ignorance) the material cause (उपादानं), as a spider by its own principality is the instrumental cause, and by the principality of its body the material cause of the web. From the soul, covered with unconsciousness, as illusive power, (the second power) in which the darkness (the third quality) prevails, is produced the ether,† from the ether the wind, from the wind the fire, from the fire the water, from the water the earth.

“From *this* soul, in which unconsciousness is inherent, the ether is produced,” says the Sruti. In the cause of them (the five elements,) darkness predominates on account of the prevalence of the inanimate in those elements; in that state are the three qualities, (truth, action and darkness) produced in the ether and the other elements according to the quality of their causes. Those subtile elements are called atoms (तन्मात्रं) and uncombined elements.

From them are produced the organisms and the gross elements. The subtile organisms are the seventeen organs, and the internal organisms. Those organs are the five intellectual senses, understanding and reason, the five organs of acting and the five internal airs. The intellectual senses are the ear, the sense of touch (skin,) the eyes the tongue and the nose. They are separately, according to their order, produced from the united parts of the first quality of those elements. *Understanding* is called बुद्धिः, *Reason.* मनः, that action of the mind, by which it asserts; *reason* चित्तं, that action of the mind, by which it doubts or decides; in both (actions) are *thinking* (चित्तं) and consciousness included; thinking is that action of the

\* There are three kinds of causes, 1. Samaváyikárana, the same which is here called उपादानं, which signifies the elements, of which any substance may be produced, therefore material cause; 2. Asamaváyikárana, the actual union of the composing parts; 3. Nimitta Kárana, the instrument, by which an effect is produced; vide Bhasha Parichéda.

† आकाशः is the first element, in which all others are comprehended; according to the Bhasha Parichéda it is everywhere, and has, with the exception of the sound, the same attributes with time. In want of a more appropriate term ether perhaps expresses best its meaning.

*Consciousness.* mind, by which it examines; consciousness, by which

**अहङ्कारः** it perceives its actions as its own actions. They are also produced by the united first qualities of those elements, which is evident from the fact, that they have the power to manifest. The understanding together with the intellectual senses, forms the

*Intelligent case of the soul.* intelligent case of the soul; this (case) on account of its manifesting the impulses of dominion, possession and pride, is called the administering sentient soul, the possessor of this and another world. The reason together with the organs of

*Mental case of the soul.* action form the mental case. Organs of action are word, hand, foot, the organs of evacuation and generation. They are separately according to their order, produced by parts of the second quality. *The vital airs* are those of respiration, of inspiration, of circulation, the guttural air and the equalizing air, (of digestion.) The air of *respiration* (**प्राणः**) is going upwards through the nose, that of *inspiration* (**अप्राणः**) going downwards to the lower extremity of the intestine, that of *circulation* is diffused throughout the whole body. The *guttural wind* (**उदानः**) moving upwards turns back again, and has its place in the throat. The equalizing air (**समानः**) passing through the middle of the body, equalizes the food, which is taken by eating or drinking; to equalize is to digest and to produce the different substances for assimilation or excretion. Others maintain five airs, different from those above mentioned, viz. of eructation, of winking, of digestion, of yawning and of nourishing. The air of eructation (**नागृ**) produces belching, that of winking (**कृम्भः**) effects the closing of the eyes, &c. that of digestion (**कृकरः**) produces hunger, that of yawning (**देवदत्तः**) produces yawning, that of nourishing (**धनञ्जयः**) makes the body stout. Others assert, that the latter five airs are included in the former classes. The five vital airs are produced by the united second qualities of the five elements, and

*Vital case.* form together with the acting organs the vital case; it is produced by parts of the second qualities, because it is living action.

Among those cases the intelligent case, having the faculty of knowledge, is the ruling, the mental case, having the faculty of desire, is the causal, and the *vital case*, having the faculty of action, is the performer of works. The divisions of the cases are made according to

their fitness (for certain actions.) They are called, when united, the subtile organism of the soul. Here also becomes the whole subtile organism by being the object of One mind, universal organism like the forests and the sea, and by being the object of many minds, special organisms, like the trees and the waters. The soul, in which the

*Hiranyagarbha.*

universality is inherent, is called (Hiranyagarbha) the cause of himself, the sentient (conscious) being, because all things are arranged in him, and because the powers of knowledge and of action are inherent in him. The universality of this is the subtile organism (of the soul,) because it is subtler than the gross organism. The threefold case, having the desire of awaking, is dream, and therefore called the place of destruction of the gross organism.—Taijasa the soul, in which the speciality of this threefold organism is inherent, is called the *manifesting mind*. The speciality of this is the subtile organism from its being subtler than the gross organism. This threefold case having the desire of awaking, is dream, and therefore called the place of destruction of the gross organism. Both Shútráta and Taijasa perceive in that state the subtile objects by the subtile powers of the mind.

“Taijasa, the subtile possessor,” says the Sruti.

In that state there is no difference between Shútráta and Taijasa, in which the universality and speciality are inherent, as there is none between the sky which covers the forest and the trees, or the sky which is reflected by the sea and many waters. Thus is the production of the subtile organism.

The gross elements are composed of the subtile ones according to the combination of five. The combination of five is to divide each of the five elements into two parts,

*Production of the gross elements, combination of five.*

पञ्चीकृतं

then equally to divide each of the five former of the ten parts into four parts, to separate these four of the one half from their own parts, and to join them with the parts of the other elements. The combination of five is proved beyond doubt by the Sruti, in which a combination of three of the same kind occurs. Though the elements are equalized with each other (containing a fourth part of their former halves) yet it is proper to call them by their own name, according to the greater proportion of one element (in that combination.)

In that state sound is manifested in the ether, sound and feeling in the wind, sound, feeling and colour in the fire, these three with taste in the water, and these four with smell in the earth.

From these five elements, combined in the said manner, were produced the different Upper Lókas\* (worlds) viz., Bhur-lóka, Bhuvar-lóka, Swar-lóka, Mahar-lóka, Janar-lóka, Tapar-lóka and Satya-lóka, which are placed above the others, then the Nether-lokas,† viz., Atala, Bitala, Sutala, Rasatala, Talátala, Mahátala and Patála, which are placed one beneath the other, farther Bramha's mundane egg, the gross organisms in their fourfold division, contained in that egg, and food, water and other substances.

Bodies (organic) are either produced from the womb, or from eggs, or from damp, or from germs. Those produced from the womb are born alive, as men, animals, &c.; from eggs come forth from an egg, as birds, serpents, &c.; produced from the damp are worms, insects, &c.; which are born from hot moisture, produced from germs are those which emerge from the earth, as creepers, trees, &c.

Here also is the gross organism in its fourfold division, by being the object of one or many minds either a totality, like the forest or the ocean, or separated into a plurality of bodies, like the trees and waters. The soul in which this totality is inherent, is called Vashwánara, Viráj, on account of its knowing itself as the totality of men, and of its governing the universe. This gross body is here

\* **लोकः** (Lóka) world, division of the universe in general, three divisions are enumerated, or heaven, hell and earth; another classification enumerates seven, exclusive of the infernal regions, or *Bhurlóka*, the earth, *Bhuvar-lóka*, the space between the earth and the sun, the region of the Munis, Siddhis, &c. *Sver-lóka* the heaven of Indra, between the sun and the polar-star. *Mahar-lóka*, the usual abode of Bhrigu and other saints, who are supposed to be co-existent with Brahma. During the conflagration of the lower worlds, the saints ascend to the next, or *Jana-lóka*, which is described as the abode of Bramha's sons, Sanaca, Sananda, Sanatana and Sanatacumara; above this is the fifth world, or the *Tapar-lóka*, where the deities, called Vairagis reside; the seventh world, *Satya-lóka*, or *Bramha-lóka* is the abode of Bramha, and translation to this world exempts beings from farther birth; the three-first world are destroyed at the end of each calpa or day of Bramha; the three last at the end of his life, or 100 of his years; the fourth Lóka is equally permanent, but it is uninhabitable from heat at the time the three first are burning. Wils. Sansc. Dict.

† Internal regions, in which various evil beings have their abodes.

the universal gross body of the soul, and because it is subject to change from nutriment, it is called the nutritious case of the soul ; it is called awake, because it is the place in which the gross organisms are enjoyed.

The soul in which the speciality of this gross organism in its four-fold division is inherent, is called *Bishwa*, (which enters into all) because, not leaving the subtler body it enters into the gross body. The gross body of the soul as speciality, because it is subject to change from nutriment, is called the nutritious case of the soul, it is called awake, because it is the place in which the gross things are enjoyed. In that state perceive both Biswa and Baishánara (the universal soul and the single soul, in which the gross organism is inherent) by their five intellectual organs, which are respectively ruled by the quarters of the world, the winds, the sun, Varuna (god of waters) and the Aswis (Gemini) sound, feeling, colour, taste and smell, by their organs of action, which are respectively ruled by the fire, Indra, Upendra, (form of Vishnu) Jama, (death) Prajapati, (Bramha as creator) they possess the power of speech, taking, going, evacuating, generating, and by the internal four organs, understanding, reason, consciousness and thinking, which are respectively ruled by Chandra (moon) Chaturmukha, (the fourfaced, a form of Bramha) Chankara, (a form of Shiva) Achyuta, (Srikrishna) they possess the power of asserting, deciding, consciousness and thinking, that is to say, they possess all the objects of the gross organism.

“ In the state of awaking knows the soul the external objects,” says the Sruti.

In that state there is also no difference between Bishwa and Baishánara, in whom the universality and speciality of the gross organism are inherent, as there is none between the sky, which is covered by the forest, and the trees, or between the sky, which is reflected by the sea, and by many waters. Thus is the production of the universe of the gross organism from the five elements, in the combination of five. The universality of the expanses of the gross, subtle and causal bodies is one great expanse, as the universality of inner forests becomes one great forest, or as the universality of inner oceans one great ocean. The soul, in which this is inherent, from Bishva and Baishanara to the Supreme Ruler is *one soul*, like

the sky, covered by inner forests, or like the sky, reflected by the inner oceans. The uninherent soul, when like a burning iron-ball, not separated from both, the great expanse and the soul, in which the former is inherent, is the literal meaning of the great sentence : all this is in truth Bramha ; when separated, it is the real meaning. Thus is the improper transferring of an unreal thing upon the real thing generally explained.

The various modes of placing this and this, or that and that, upon the all-pervading soul, will now be specified.

*Various modes of transferring.*

A very common man, because the Sruti says, " The soul is born as a son," because he loves his son as himself, and because, when his son is in good or bad circumstances, he thinks himself so, asserts, that *the son is the soul*. A Chárváka\*, because the Sruti says, " This soul is a body of blood and flesh, because he leaves his own son in a burning house to save himself, and because he thinks, I am stout, I am thin, asserts, that the gross body is the soul." Another Chárváka, because the Sruti says, " The sentient souls, repairing to the Lord of creation, addressed him thus," because there is a want of bodily motion, when there is a want of the intellectual organs, and because he thinks, I am blind, I am deaf, asserts, that the intellectual organs are the soul. Another Chárváka, because the Sruti says, " The other internal soul is vital," because there is a want of action of the intellectual senses, when the vital airs are wanting, and because he thinks, I am hungry, I am thirsty, asserts, that the vital airs are the soul. Another Chárváka, because the Sruti says, " The other internal soul is reason," because there is a want of the action of the vital airs, &c., when the mind sleeps, and because he thinks, I assent, I doubt, asserts, that the reason is the soul. A Bauddha,† because

\* Colebrooke, R. A. Trans. vol. i. p. 597, says of the sect of the Chárvácas, that they restrict to perception only the means of proof and sources of knowledge, that besides the four elements, earth, water, fire and wind, they acknowledge no other principles, that the soul is not different from the body.

† Col. Miscell. Essays, vol. i. p. 396. The Bauddhas or Saugatas are followers of Buddha or Sugata. No less than four sects have arisen among the followers of Buddha. Some maintain, that all is void. To those the designation of Mádhyamika is asserted by several of the commentators of the Védánta. Other disciples of Buddha...maintain the existence of conscious sense alone. These are called

the Sruti says, "Another internal soul is knowledge," because there is no action of the organs, when there is no ruler (first mover,) and because he thinks, I am enjoying, asserts, that the understanding is the soul. Prábhákaras and logicians, because the Sruti says, "another internal soul is pleasure, because it is evident, that ignorance destroys the understanding, and because they think, we are ignorant, we know, assert, that ignorance is the soul.

The followers of Bhatta, because the Sruti says, "The soul is knowledge as pleasure," because in deep sleep manifestation and also non-manifestation take place, and because they think, we do not know ourselves, assert, that the soul, in which unconsciousness is inherent, is the soul.

Another Baudha, because the Sruti says, "This (universe) was before (the creation) nothing," because in deep sleep there remains nothing, and because he who awakes, naturally thinks, I did not exist in deep sleep, asserts, that the soul is nothing.

In all those assertions, commencing with the son and terminating with the nothing, (void) the soul is asserted to be what really is not the soul. As the apparent arguments from the Sruti, inference and observation, which commence from the common assertion of the son, clearly show, that one argument from the Sruti, inference and observation is refuted by arguments of the same kind, it is evident, that the soul is not the son, &c. That the soul is not mind, not a first mover, that it is mere knowledge, mere existence, follows from the contradiction of a much more powerful Sruti, it follows from the reason, that all those inanimate principles from the son up to the void, by having their existence only through the manifestation of the soul, are transient like all material beings, and also, that there is much greater authority in the thought of the wise: I am Bramha. It is therefore evident from the contradiction of these arguments from the Sruti, inference and observation, that none of these principles is the soul. Therefore the eternal, pure, omniscient, free, true, self-existent (or

Jógáchárás. Others, again, affirm the actual existence of external objects no less than internal sensations. Some of them recognise the immediate perception of interior objects. Others contend for a mediate apprehension of them. Hence two branches of the sect of Buddha, one denominated Sautrântica, the other Vaibhâshica.

whose nature is true) all pervading Cháitanya, which manifests all those principles, is the supreme soul, this is the opinion of those that know the Védánta. Thus the improper transferring.

Abstraction (अपवादः) is called the action, by which the real thing is acknowledged as the only real thing, after the expanse of the unreal things which commence from the unconsciousness, has been removed from it, as a rope is acknowledged to be a mere rope, when the (notion of the) serpent has been removed from it. In this manner has the place of fruition, viz., the gross body in its fourfold division, the substances which are fit to be enjoyed, as drinking, food, &c., in this manner the place of their support, the earth and the other fourteen worlds, in this manner Bramhá's egg (the universe) all this has its existence alone in the gross elements in the combination of five, which are the cause of them. The elements in the combination of five together with the sound and other objects of the gross bodies, all this has its existence alone in the uncombined elements, which are the cause of them. The uncombined five elements together with the three qualities (truth, action and darkness) all this has its existence alone in the soul, in which unconsciousness as its cause, is inherent, further, this unconsciousness and the soul, in which it is inherent and which has the predicates of supreme lord, &c., is merely the fourth Bramha, the uninherent soul, which is the place of support for them.

The sentence, that\* art thou,† becomes by means of both, the improper transferring and abstraction explained in its full meaning; 1, the universality of ignorance and what is connected with it; 2, the soul in which it is inherent and which has the predicates of omniscience, &c.; and 3, the uninherent soul, these three are, like a burning iron-ball, when perceived as one, the literal meaning of the term *that*; the uninherent soul, being the place of support, in which the properties of that (universality) are inherent, is the designable (real) meaning of the term, *that*. These three—1, the speciality of ignorance; 2, the soul, in which it inheres; and which has the quality of ignorance and other imperfections, and 3, the soul in which this is not inherent, these three like a burning iron-ball, when perceived as

\* The universal soul.

† Any individual intelligence.

one, are the literal meaning of the term, thou ; the all-pervading blessed, fourth, supreme soul, being the place of support, in which the properties of that (speciality) are inherent, is the designable (real) meaning of the term, *thou*.

III. Connexion.—The meaning of the great sentence will now be explained. The sentence : *that art thou*, explains the true signification of the infinite Bramha by the three categories of relation. The three categories are : 1, the relation of what is identical in these two terms ; 2, the relation of what is distinguishable and distinguishing (subject and predicate) in the meaning of them ; 3, the relation of what is designable and what is designing in the meaning of those terms, viz. the universal and the single soul ; for it is said, “ that the identification, the fixing of what is distinguishable and distinguishing, and the relation between what is designable and designing explain the meaning of the terms of the single and universal soul.”

1. The *category of identification* ; as in the sentence, that is this Dévadatta, the term *that*, which refers to Dévadatta, as being in a past time, and the term *this*, which refers to Dévadatta, as being in the present time, (both terms) design the connexion in one and the same place ; thus also in the great sentence, “ that art thou,” both terms, viz. the term of *that*, which means the soul, as having the attributes of invisibility, &c. and the term of *thou*, which means the soul, as having the attributes of visibility, &c., design the connexion in one and the same soul.

2. The *category of what is distinguishable and what is distinguishing* (subject and predicate) ; as in the former sentence, (that is this Dévadatta) the meaning of the term *that*, which refers to Dévadatta, as being in a past time, and the term *this*, which refers to Dévadatta, as being in the present time, both come into the relation of what is distinguishable and distinguishing by the annihilation of their mutual differences ; thus also in the great sentence both terms, viz. the term *that*, which means the soul, as having the attributes of invisibility, &c., and the term *thou*, which means the soul, as having the attributes of visibility, &c. come into the relation of what is distinguishable and distinguishing by annihilation of their mutual differences.

3. The *category of what is designable and what is designing*, as in the same sentence, (that is this Dévadatta) the relation of the design-

able and the designing refers simply to Dévadatta, in which there is no contradiction, after the contradictory terms of *that* and *this* or their corresponding meanings, being in the past and in the present time, have been dispensed with ; thus also in the great sentence the relation of the designable and the designing, refers simply to the soul, in which there is no contradiction, after the contradictory terms *that* and *thou*, or their corresponding meanings, viz. having the attributes of invisibility and visibility, have been dispensed with.

This category is called the partial designation. In the great sentence the meaning is not consistent,\* as it is in the literal meaning of the sentence—the lotus is blue. In this case, as in the term *blue*, the quality of blue, and in the term *lotus*, the thing lotus, exclude other qualities and things, as for instance white, and cloth ; and as the unity of the mutual connexion of predicate and subject, or the unity of the one, determined by the other, are in correspondence with each other, because there is no contradiction from another argument, (in this case) the meaning of the sentence is consistent ; but if you think that, in the great sentence, by excluding the mutual differences of the term *that*, which means the invisible Cháitanya (soul,) and of the term *thou*, which means the visible Cháitanya, the meaning of the sentence does agree, viz. the connexion between predicate and subject, or of the unity of the one, determined by the other, we must maintain, that the meaning of the sentence is not consistent, because it involves the contradiction of the invisibility, &c. Nor is here an omitting designation (ellipsis,) as in the sentence—on the Ganga lives the herdsman, consistent. As there is in this case a perfect contradiction in the meaning of the sentence, which expresses a connexion between the support, and what is to be supported, viz. the Ganga and the herdsman, the ellipsis is called for, because there is a propriety in the designation of the bank of the Ganga, by entirely dispensing with the meaning of the sentence. In the great sentence, however, as there is no contradiction in one part alone of the meaning which shows the unity of the invisible and visible Cháitanya, the ellipsis cannot take place, because another ellipsis would be improper without also dispensing with the other

\* The author, after having discussed the three categories of relation, refutes three other forms of relation, which at the first glance may appear to express the meaning of the great sentence.

part. If you say, as the term *Ganga*, by entirely rejecting its own meaning, points to the term *bank*; so also the terms *that* and *thou* by entirely rejecting their literal meaning, point to the terms, *thou* and *that*; why then should the ellipsis be inadmissible: then we must say, you are not right, because in the former sentence, if you did not mention the term of *bank*, its meaning was not known, which therefore required such an ellipsis; but in the latter sentence, by mentioning the terms *that* and *thou*, their meanings are fully known, and consequently there is here no necessity of knowing the meaning of one word by another through the mentioned ellipsis.

Nor is here the case of the not omitting designation admissible,\* as in the sentence—*red runs*. The sentence, which speaks of the moving of a quality, is contradictory; but here by not omitting it in the ellipsis of a horse, which is the place of this or other qualities, the contradiction is removed, and the not omitting designation is proper; but in the great sentence, on account of the contradiction in the meaning, which points out the unity of the invisible and visible *Cháitanya*, if you, not dispensing with the invisibility and visibility, refer through the said ellipsis to any other terms, the contradiction is not removed, and therefore this ellipsis cannot take place. But if you say, that the terms *that* and *thou*, by rejecting the contradictory part of their own meanings, point to the terms *that* and *thou*, as united with the other part, and if you continue, why then do you not grant a partial ellipsis by another means? We must say, that this is not proper, because it is impossible to grant an ellipsis for both, viz., for a part of its own meaning and for another term by a single term; and also because the meaning of the terms being known, there is no necessity to know them by an ellipsis.

As therefore the sentence, this is that *Dévadatta*, or its meaning on account of the contradiction in a part of its meaning, which refers to *Dévadatta*, as being in the present and in the past time, by omitting the part which refers to the contradictory terms, being in the present and in the past time, the not contradictory part only, viz. *Dévadatta*, remains; so in the great sentence, *that art thou*, or the meaning of it, on account of the contradiction in a part of its meaning, which

\* This term means, that a word retains its literal meaning, while at the same time it points to a term, which is not included in it.

refers to the invisible and visible Chaitanya, by omitting the part which refers to the contradictory terms, having the attributes of invisibility and visibility, refers to the not contradictory part only, viz. Cháitanya (soul.)

The meaning of the great sentence, *I am Bramha*, which was received by internal perception, will now be given.

When the teacher has thus, by means of the improper transferring and of the true abstraction, purified the two terms, *that* and *thou*, and the meaning of the infinite one has been explained by the great sentence, then is produced in the mind of the qualified person the act of the understanding, formed by the form of the infinite Bramha, viz., I am the eternal, pure, omniscient, free, true, self-existent, ever blessed, infinite Bramha, without duality. This act (of the understanding,) together with the (adequate) likeness of the omniscient being, by making the all-pervading, undivided, unknown, supreme Bramha its object, destroys the ignorance with regard to him.

Then as cloth is burned by the burning of the thread, which is the cause of it; so by the destruction of the ignorance, which is the cause of the whole creation, the act of the understanding, formed by the form of the infinite substance, is also destroyed, as included in that creation. As the shine of a lamp is absorbed by the overpowering rays of the sun; so the soul, which is reflected by that act of the understanding, and absorbed by the self-manifesting, all pervading, undivided, supreme Bramha, which it (the understanding) is unable to manifest, (the soul) becomes, since the act of the understanding, which is a part of his qualities, is destroyed, the all-pervading, undivided Bramha, as the face only remains, when the looking-glass, in which it was reflected, has been removed. If this is true, the contradictory statement of the two passages of the Sruti, viz., “by the mind it must be comprehended,” and “what is not perceived by the mind, is reconciled,” because by granting, that the act of the understanding makes Bramha its object, the effect (the manifestation) must be at the same time prohibited. It is also said, to make (Bramha) object of manifestation, is prohibited by the authors of the Shastras. For the destruction of the ignorance respecting Bramha, that act of the understanding is required, and it is not proper that he who manifests himself, is manifested by another.

The particulars of the act of the understanding, formed by the form of the inanimate substances, are as follow. For instance, in the perception of this thing, the act of the understanding, formed by the form of this thing, in making the (this) unknown thing its object, manifests even the inanimate matter, which is this thing, by the manifestation of the knowledge, which that act of the understanding has acquired, after the ignorance with regard to that thing has been removed, as the shine of a lamp in making any thing, concealed by darkness, its object, manifests by its own power (shine) the thing, after the darkness, in which it was concealed, has been removed.

IV. The four means.—The diligent application of the four acts, viz. hearing, attention, of contemplation and meditation, being required, until the perception of the soul, which has no other likeness but with itself, is obtained, they must be here described.

1.—*Hearing* means the fixing of the opinion of the Védántas with regard to the being without duality, by the six modes of determination, which are, the commencement and the end, the practice, the exclusion of other arguments, the final end, the proper speaking, and the demonstration.

*a. The commencement and the end* is the fixing of any subject, to be explained in a chapter (of the Védánta) in its commencement and end; for instance, in the sixth chapter of the Chandógya Upanishad, the definition of the being without duality, which is to be explained in that chapter, is in the commencement, one even without duality, and in the end, that Bramha, the life of the whole universe.

*b. Practice* is repeatedly to mention a subject in a chapter, in which it is to be explained; as for instance, in the middle of that chapter (Chandógya) the nine times mentioning of the being without duality by the great sentence, *that art thou*.

*c. The exclusion of other arguments* is not to demonstrate a subject, to be explained in a chapter, by other proofs, as in that chapter the being without duality is not demonstrated by another proof.

*d. Final end* is the fruit from the knowledge of Bramha, to be explained in a chapter, or from the practice of that knowledge, as it is mentioned in that chapter, "that the man who has a teacher, knows that he belongs to him, until he is liberated; then he will

be saved." Thus the principal fruit from the knowledge of the infinite being is to gain that end.

*e. The proper speaking* is the praising of any subject in a chapter, in which it is to be explained ; for instance, it is a praise of the being without duality in that chapter. " O thou (disciple) you asked for such advice, by which that which is never heard, is heard ; that which is never thought, is thought ; and that which is never known, is known.

*f. Demonstration* is the proper mode of deduction for the attainment of complete understanding of the subject, to be explained in a chapter ; as for instance, in that chapter, " O thou handsome youth, as all things, made of earth, are known by one clod of earth, the difference consists in words only ; the real thing is earth, so the demonstration in that chapter is the proper mode of deduction in the attainment of the complete understanding of the being without duality, that there is no difference but in words."

2.—*Attention* is the constant attending to the being without duality, by those demonstrations, which refer to it in the Védánta.

3.—*Contemplation* is the remaining of the same state of the understanding, formed by the form of the being without duality, with regard to that being, which is not believed to exist in the transient form of a body.

4.—*Meditation* is twofold ; the one in the form of difference, the other without it. Meditation, which has the form of difference, is to place upon the being without duality the act of the mind, formed by the form of it (that being) without removing the difference between him who knows, the object of knowledge, and knowledge itself. As in the perception of an earthen elephant, earth only is actually perceived ; so the being without duality is perceived even in the perception of duality. Thus it is said by philosophers, who maintain, the being, which is like the eye, which is (the support of all) like the ether, which is supreme, which is at once manifest, which is not produced, which is one (without difference in itself and from others) imperishable, in which all differences are annihilated, which is omnipresent and without duality, even this being am I, who is for ever liberated. I am perfect in knowledge, pure, unchangeable ; I am not fettered, I do not require salvation.

*The meditation without difference* is to place upon the being without duality the same act of the understanding, formed by the form of it (that being) after having removed the differences between him who knows, the object of knowledge, and knowledge itself. As water alone appears by the disappearance of salt, which is formed by the form of water; so appears the being without duality alone by the disappearance of the act of the mind, formed by the form of that being. Still it must not be thought, that there is no distinction between this state and sound sleep: for though in either the same absence of the act of the understanding does occur, yet, from the existence and not existence of that act in either state, the distinction between them is evident. This meditation includes: refraining, religious refraining, sitting in a peculiar posture, suppression of breath, coercion, internal fixing and meditation.

*Refraining* includes the following acts: refraining from injury, regard for truth, abstaining from stealing, obedience to the spiritual teacher, and not accepting (gifts.)

*Religious refraining* includes purification, contentment, devotion, reading (of the Védas) and meditation on the Supreme Ruler.

*Sitting in a peculiar posture* are the different modes of placing the members of the body in a prescribed form, as in the form of a lotus, &c.

*Suppression of the breath* is the peculiar mode of expiration and inspiration, and of keeping the breath.

*Coercion* is the refraining of the senses from their objects.

*Internal fixing* is to fix without intermission the acts of the internal senses upon that being.

*Meditation*, is here the first one, which has the difference in itself.

There are four obstacles to the perfect meditation without difference: viz. listlessness, absence of mind, passion, and propensity to pleasure.

*Listlessness* is the sleep of the mind, (caused) by not attending to the being without duality.

*Absence of mind* is attention to other things by not attending to the being without duality.

*Passion* is inadvertence to the being without duality, not from listlessness, or absence of mind, but from the act of the understanding, being fettered by the desire of love, or other passions.

Propensity to pleasure is, to enjoy by the act of the mind, no being directed to the being without duality, the pleasure, produced by the meditation, which has its difference in itself, or the enjoyment of pleasure, produced by that meditation at its commencement. When the understanding, free from those four obstacles and immovable like a lamp, protected from the wind, thus becomes the infinite Chaitánya alone, then the meditation is called that without difference. It is said, he will awaken the understanding, sunk in listlessness; he will concentrate it, when lost in absence of mind; he will enlighten it, when blinded by passion; he will not move it, when steadied by austerities; he will not let it taste pleasure; by the consideration (of universal things) it will be without fondness. As a lamp, protected from the wind, &c. &c.

*Definition of the living free.* The living free is the Bramhanishta (devoted to Bramha) who, after the infinite, self-like Bramha is known, when the ignorance with regard to him is removed by the knowledge of the self-like, infinite, pure Bramha, is free from all worldly fetters, by the destruction of the ignorance and its creation, of the unrewarded works (those works which have not borne their fruit previously to the true knowledge) of doubt, (viz. whether there is a soul different from the body or not) and of other misapprehensions. "When he, the universal soul, has been perceived, then all the conscious acts of the understanding are extinguished, then all doubts are removed, and also his works are annihilated," says the Sruti.

Though he in the time of awaking (the Bramhanishta) by his body, which is like a vessel of flesh, blood, &c., by his senses, which are like vessels of blindness, bluntless and unfitness, and by his mind, which is the vessel for the sensations of hunger, thirst, grief and error, performs the works which are worked by the impulses of his former desires, and enjoys the fruits of his undertakings, which (the fruits) are no obstacles to the true knowledge; still he does not actually perform or enjoy them, since he has destroyed the whole creation of ignorance, as a person, who knows a thing, which he perceives to be an illusion of his senses, does not actually believe in its reality, though he may perceive it. "As one seeing does not see, or hearing does not hear," says the Sruti. It is also said, who in a waking state is like a person fast asleep, who does not perceive, though perceiving, duality, because he is

above duality, who, though acting, does not act, he knows the soul none else; this is certain. As previously to the obtainment of this knowledge he followed the sensations of hunger and other appetites, so he (now) follows (only) the impulses to good works, or there is the same indifference to good and evil actions. It is said, "If he, who knows the reality of the being without duality, can act according to his desire, what difference is then between a dog and him who knows the truth, as regards the taking of impure food. He knows the soul, who has purified the knowledge of Bramha (from ignorance) not another, must be the answer. Humility of mind, the cause of true knowledge, benevolence and other virtues will adorn him like ornaments (in that state.) It is said, he who has gained perfect knowledge of the soul, possesses benevolence and other virtues, without effort on his part; but not he (possesses them without effort) who is striving for the means of salvation. What else can I say? He, who for the maintenance of his body only suffers the happiness and misery, resulting from his works, which are done to accomplish his own desires and aversions, as well as those of others, and brings to light the impulses of his mind, will on the approach of death unite his life with the all-pervading, ever blessed, supreme Bramha; and having thus destroyed the perception of ignorance and of its creation, he will exist as the supreme Bramha, who is perfect salvation, the fountain of all bliss, and free from the signs of every difference. His life is not taken to other places, but to him (Bramha) it is flowing. Free, he is made free; thus says the Sruti.



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